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The imperial economic conference held in Ottawa in July - August
1932 was not a successful exercise in imperial economic co-
operation. Instead it produced a series of bilateral trade
agreements mai nly between the Uni ted Ki ngdom and each of the
dominions in turn. On the British side Ottawa was seen as
confirming the move from free trade to protection that was made
through the Import Duties Act of February 1932. Ottawa was also
seen as a move toward greater reliance on imperial preference.
But these policy shifts were hardly decisive. In terms of a
recent judgment the protection was 'distinctly mi Id1 and the
imperial preference 'very diluted'.' Since imperial economic co-
operation was the main policy plank of Britain's coalition
'National' government, it was the United Kingdom delegation
(which included half the cabinet) that had to make most of the
concessions during the Ottawa negotiations.
What the dominions mainly hoped for from Ottawa was that imperial
preference would give them privileged access in the British
market for thei r exports of primary products. While trade in
general had shrunk since the onset of the Great Depression in
1929, the falls in volume and in price of their exports had been
far greater than those for Britain's exports of manufactures. In
the decade up to 1929 the dominions had been separately trying
to increase their trade with foreign countries. The contraction
of trade and the erection of tariff walls during the depression
made this more difficult and increased dominion reliance on the
relatively open British market. The hope of the dominions was
that the British shift to protection would mean the imposition
of tariffs against foreign supplies of primary products to the
British market.
A further vital interest common to the dominions at Ottawa was
the need to protect their own new secondary industries. They were
all committed to protectionism of some kind prior to 1929 but the
Great Depression had turned them into more devoted adherents. The
fal1 ing prices for thei r exports meant that thei r imports of
manufactures were harder to pay for. This underlined their need
to achieve import substitution by protecting their industries.
As a result the dominions were reluctant to make any major
concessions, on the basis of reciprocal imperial preference, that
would benefit British exports to their markets. They preferred
to raise tariffs on foreign commodities rather than reduce
tariffs on goods from the United Kingdom.
The move from free trade i s sometimes seen i n the context of
Britain's political and economic decline in the twentieth
century/ Free trade could no longer be relied on as a formula
to ensure that Britain retained her status as a world power. The
Ottawa conference took place near the end of the period during
which the dominions were advancing toward fully fledged political
and constitutional sovereignty, as epitomised in the Statute of
Westminster of 1931. This shift of political authority from the
imperial centre to the dominion periphery is consistent with the
image of British political decline. But at the economic level,
especial 1y during the Great Depression, there is no necessary
counterpart to this. The dominions experienced acute economic
insecurity during the depression. Their trading dependence on the
United Kingdom increased during these years (1929 - 1934) and
they looked to Ottawa to provide some shelter from the 'economic
blizzard1. According to Hancock, in the aftermath of the
conference the dominions shared a concern that *the Ottawa plan
of the British Commonwealth must not be alowed to modify the
Statute of Westminster plan....the current of economic
integration, whatever its strength might be would not be allowed
to cut .across [the] constitutional channels.. . . But the fact
that the economic dependence of the dominions on Britain
persisted after Ottawa pointed to the danger that the dissolution
of the bonds of formal empire might be counter-balanced by the
survival of those of informal empire.
In a general way South Africa's stake in the Ottawa proceedings
was similar to that of the other dominions. But there were also
features of South Africa's involvement that were distinctive. The
approach of the Union government to the issue of imperial
preference had sharply altered with the advent of the Nationalist
Labour Pact government in 1924. Hertzog's long-standing
principle of 'South Africa first' meant that in the event of a
conflict of interests between South Africa and the British Empire
it should be the interests of the former that prevailed. Over the
years he had made it clear that the principle appl ied to the
economic as we! 1 as the pol i tical sphere. In the case of the
former the Union government should pursue the goal of economic
independence or self-sufficiency. There was thus a component of
economic nationalism in Nationalist policy that, following its
endorsement by the Labour Party, entered the Pact programme. The
Union should f i nd ways of reducing its economic dependence on
Bri tai n.
The explicit commitment to this ideological goal under the Pact
was far stronger than any equivalent programme entertained by the
governments of the other dominions. The Pact policy demanded that
the Union move away from imperial preference. The new Minister
of Mines and Industries, F W Beyers, described imperial
preference as a 'ring fence1 that blocked South Africa's efforts
to increase its trade with other countries. The most notable of
these efforts was the controversial commercial treaty that South
Africa concluded with Germany at the end of 1928. The treaty
contained no express provision for safeguarding the existing
preferential arrangements between South Africa and Britain.
A further aspect of economic nationalism as pursued by the Pact
was the promotion of manufacturing industry in South Africa. This
was to be achieved through a policy of tariff protection. In
addition, direct state initiatives to establish new industries
were soon taken, notably in the legislation to establish the Iron
and Steel Corporation in 1928. In 1924 legislation was passed
reconstituting the Board of Trade and Industries. Four full time
members were appointed under the chairmanship of A J Bruwer, an
academic economist who was a proponent of protection. The Board
was intructed to submit recommendations for the revision of the
Union's tariff policy. Part of its response, as wi11 be shown
below, was a sustained attack on imperial preference led by
Bruwer.
The basis of the Pact government.'s policy regarding imperial
preference was a report published by the new Board of Trade and
Industries. Entitled 'South Africa and Imperial Preference', the
report called not for the abandonment of the preferential
arrangements with Britain, but, in effect, their rationalisation.
From a South African standpoint several 'defects' of the existing
arrangements were diagnosed. It was held that the arrangements
that had evolved, instead of being on a quid pro quo basis, were
one-sidedly in Britain's favour. Also under the existing
'haphazard system' a policy of protection for South African
secondary industries would be less effective. The report claimed
that the South African consumer did not get the full benefit of
the preferences given by Britain and pointed to the sacrifice of
revenue that resulted from the importation of British goods
enjoying preference. The preferential system requi red the
dominions to practise discrimination against countries outside
the British Empi re. Discrimination could wel 1 result in
retaliation, yet the best prospects for the expansion of South
African exports lay outside Britain since the possibilities of
that market had already been fully explored.
The Board's main recommendation therefore was that the
preferential arrangements with Britain should be placed on a quid
pro quo basis 'and that similar concessions be extended to
countries outside the British Empi re in return for equivalent
reciprocal advantages'. The necessary reduction in the value of
the preferences given to Britain was to be secured by limiting
these to a narrower range of specified commodities. Commenting
on the the Board's report, the Union's Commissioner off Customs
and Excise, J D Heddon, argued in favour of retaining the British
preferences but agreed that the preferential tariff granted to
Britain should be revised and limited to articles on which it was
really required. The Board of Trade and Industries, in a second
report published in 1925, submitted detailed proposals for
revised duties on British and dominion goods, adding a
recommendation favouring 'the use of the tariff as an instrument
for negotiation not only with Great Britain and the British
Dominions and Colonies, but also with countries outside the
British Empi re'.
Introducing his budget proposals in April 1925, N C Havenga, the
Mini ster of Finance, announced the Pact's new tari ff policy.
Acknowledging that it was based on the recommendations of the
Board of Trade and Industries, he also pointed to its continuity
with Smuts's cal1, made at the 1923 Imperial Conference, for
greater reciprocity in preferential arrangements with Britain.
The value of the preferences granted by the Union of #950 000
(#860 000 to Britain and #90 000 to the other dominions) in 1924
was to be cut to #350 000 (#300 000 to Britain and #50 000 to the
dominions). In terms of the list tabled during the debate, the
number of commodities on which Britain was to enjoy preference
was reduced from over a hundred to twenty-two, but^  at the same
time the rebate on some of these was increased."4 During the
debate, in response to the South African Party opposition's
attack on his proposals, Havenga announced the cabinet's decision
to grant an important concession (which was certainly not among
the recommendations of the Board of Trade and industries): this
was a guarantee of most-favoured-nation treatment for Britain in
respect of the new rebates.'" Wi th the detai1s i ncorporated
into the Tariff Act of 1925, the new policy took effect in July
of that year with certain additions, made under ministerial
authority, in June 1926.
While the contribution of the Board of Trade and Industries
to the making of the new tariff pol icy was crucial , its
implementation was largely given over to Havenga. A possible
reason for this concerns its fiscal implications, given the high
proportion of the Union's revenues that was made up of customs
duties. At the the imperial conferences of 1926 and 1930 Hertzog,
while making general pronouncements on economic policy, largely
delegated this area to Havenga. Viewing the Ottawa Conference as
a continuation of the economic sub-committee of the 1930 Imperial
Conference, Hertzog did not contemplate attending himself and
entrusted the leadership of the South African delegation to
Havenga. There was no doubt about Havenga's leadership of
economic policy. Neither his cabinet col leagues nor senior
civil servants made much input into South Africa's preparations
for the Ottawa Conference itself: everything seemed to hinge on
Havenga.
Once the new tariff pol icy was in place in 1925, the Union
government's position was that no further preferences could be
offered to Britain until South African exports, benefiting from
preferences granted by Britain, had increased to the point at
which reciprocity, in terms of the values of the preferences on
both sides, had been achieved. Havenga used the imperial
conference of 1926 as a further platform from which to expound
the new policy. The preferences that were being withdrawn were
on commodities such as woollen piece-goods and clothing, in which
Britain already held the market. But certain preferences were
being increased, such as those on machinery, metal manufactures
and cheaper cotton goods. Concedi ng that the amount of duty
rebated would fal1, Havenga nevertheless claimed that the
increased rebates on speci fie commodities were 'proving of
material assistance to the British manufacturer'. Meanwhile the
extension of British preferences since July 1925 to South African
agricultural goods such as sugar and dried fruit was 'tending to
restore the balance as far as our mutual trade is concerned'."
Three years later, in Apri1 1928, and again in February 1929,
Havenga indicated that the increase in South African exports to
Britain had still not reached the point at which the preferences
could be regarded as fuily reciprocal and therefore no new
preferences to Britain could yet be contemplated.12
With the Tariff Act passed and in line with the recommendations
of the Board of Trade and Industries, the Union government
responded positively to approaches from foreign countries seeking
to conclude commercial treaties with South Africa. The most
important of these was the treaty with Germany signed in December
1928. In this treaty Germany was promised most-favoured-nation
treatment in future. The Union's existing preferences to Britain
were safeguarded, but in terms of article 8 of the treaty, any
new preferences given to Britain would have to be extended also
to Germany. Because of the existing preferences already enjoyed
by Britain, Germany had evidently refused to negotiate with the
Union on a reciprocal basis, which was what the Union government
would have preferred. Treaties between the Union and other
foreign countries were also contemplated. Belgium and Italy
evidently declined to negotiate so long as the Union retained the
right to increase its preferences to Britain.1"
Apart from commercial treaties with foreign countries, the Union
government also explored the possi bi1i ty of making bilateral
arrangements, based on imperial preference, with the other
dominions. In parllament Havenga claimed that the mutual
arrangements for preference between the Union and Canada were
very much in Canada's favour and that it would be difficult to
obtain an agreement placing the preferences on a reciprocal
basis. In July 1925 Australia terminated the preferences it had
hitherto granted the Union. According to Havenga the reason for
this was Australian objections to granting preference to South
African mai ze that was allegedly produced by cheap black
labour.'* General 1y, both in the British and other markets,
South African agricultural exports were in competition with those
of the other dominions. There seemed therefore to be 1ittle
potential for bilateral preferential agreements with them.
Referring to South African policy in the late twenties, Drummond
remarks that the Union .was moving as far away from imperial
preference as it dared.15 Certainly by 1930 the Board of Trade
and Industries, with the sa/ne chairman and substantially the same
membership as in 1925, had radically altered its stance on
imperial preference. In August 1930, shortly before the imperial
conference, the Board submitted three memoranda for the
consideration of the Union cabinet. Unlike its reports of 1924
and 1925 (mentioned above), none of these was ever published. The
fi rst memorandum, entitled * Inter-Imperial Trade', stated that
1
 the ultimate aim of the Union must be the total abolition of
preference'. Instead the Union's external trade policy should be
one giving 'equal treatment to all and special favours to none'.
The case against imperi al preference was based i n part on i ts
disadvantages, through discrimination against foreign countries,
for a policy seeking to increase the Union's trade with them. The
memorandum claimed that, taking into account re-exports of Union
products from Britain, non-British countries took not 41.9 per
cent of the Union's products, as the official statistics
suggested, but some 65-70 per cent. On the other side the Union
was buying far more from Britain than vice-versa. A further
objection to imperial preference was its tendency to create an
artificial dependence on a particular market for products
enjoying preference, such as wine and sugar in the Bri tish
market. Although the only sound principle was for tnese products
to compete on an equal footing with their competitors, the report
conceded that wine and sugar constituted 'vested interests ...
which could not simply be ignored'. Instead of preference such
products could be supported through export suiifr \di es. '"'
The second memorandum, entitled 'British Imperial ism and Imperial
Preference', attacked imperial preference more sharply.
Preference was viewed as a possible instrument of economic
imperialism. Even if its constitutional bonds with Britain were
loosened, South Africa's economic dependence on Britain might be
maintained, with imperial preference serving that end. It was
anomalous that South Africa, while enjoying an independent status
in constitutional terms, should be obliged to discriminate
against foreign countries such as Germany: the preferential
arrangements with Britain served to prevent the Union from
granting most-favoured-nation treatment to Germany. The
memorandum also dismissed the idea that imperial preference could
be a remedy against the depression. The movement for Empire Free
Trade was attacked, since such a system would mean a tariff wall
against foreign countries and advantages for British
mamnufactures over the products of secondary industries in the
dominions. The emphasis of the advocates of Empire Free Trade
on imperial unity was seen as a British response to competition
from Germany and the United States. As to imperial preference in
the future, the memorandum warned that any expansion of the
preferences granted by Britain would have 'a disadvantageous
influence1 on the Union's relations with foreign countries.
Therefore the 'utmost concession' that the Union should make at
the forthcoming imperial conference should be to maintain the
existing preferences and then to stabilise them on the best basis
possible: there was a need for the Union to be able to guarantee
that these preferences would not be added to in the future.1' In
the third memorandum, entitled 'The Commercial Treaty Policy of
the Union of South Africa with special reference to Imperial
Preference', the abolition of preference, and in particular
the freedom to extend it, was again advocated. Stating that
exceptions to the most-favoured-nation approach should be limited
as far as possible, this memorandum also attacked inter-dominion
preferences as anomalous in the light of dominion autonomy.
The absence of a cabinet collection in the Union's official
records makes it difficult to determine precisely what course of
action was decided upon in response to these three memoranda from
the Board of Trade and Industries. As carried out by Hertzog and
Havenga, Union policy hitherto had been far more cautious than
the 1 ine advocated by the Board. In February 1929 Havenga, in
response to the Opposition's criticism of the German treaty, had
shown a concern to preserve the existing 'very valuable
preferences' from Britain. Pointing out that the German treaty
was only binding on the Union for an initial two years, after
which six months notice could be given to terminate it, he made
it clear that he would be in favour of such a course if the
ci rcumstances of the Union's preferential arrangements with
Britain altered. Although his view was that 'a considerable time'
would need to elapse before increased preferences from the United
Kingdom could be considered, he certainly did not rule out a new
set of arrangements that would include extended preferences from
Britain. '9
In the same month of the Labour Party's return to power in
Britain (June 1929), the Union government made an unsuccesful
approach to obtain a renewal, on a bi lateral basis, of the
preference arrangements with Britain. In September 1929, in
response to the stated intention of the Chancel lor of the
Exchequer, Philip Snowden, to do away with dominion preferences,
the Union government cabled to London, pointing out the 'serious
consequences to producers in the Union who have resorted to or
have arranged their scale of production on the basis of existing
preference' and asking for an opportuni ty to discuss the
question. The British reply indicated that in view of the new
government's mandate to remove duties on the 'necessaries of
life' it would be difficult to defer the question, but also that
the preferences would remain in force for the present.
In the run-up in 1930 to the imperial conference, Havenga
indicated as early as April the Union's interest in securing
reciprocal preferences with Britain, adding that if these could
be negotiated the German treaty would not be allowed to stand in
the way. A1 though he made no menti on of the German treaty,
Hertzog took a similar line in his public statements before the
conference. Towards the end of July he warned that if the British
government carried out its declared policy of discarding
preference for dominion products, there would be changes in the
tariff policies of the dominions.
In his opening statement at the imperial conference Hertzog,
after again expressing concern- over 'the prospective abolition
of existing tariff benefits', indicated that the Union would
welcome 'inter-Commonwealth trade agreements providing for the
extension of reciprocal tariff benefits on a fair and reasonable
basis, and for periods sufficiently lengthy to create confidence
and stability1. During the conference Hertzog also associated
the Union with the other dominions in their hopes concerning 'a
readjustment of the economic basis of Great Britain's fi seal
policy', while at the same time clear 1y accepti ng Bri tai n's ri ght
to adhere to free trade. After it was made clear in a statement
by the Colonial Secretary, J H Thomas, that th;s was Britain's
intention , the Union delegation , amp! i f y ing Hertzog's or i gi rial
suggestion, declared that the existing preferential margins given
by South Africa would not be teduced for a period of three years
or any shorter period during which British preferences accorded
to So^th Africa were in force.- No other dominion made any
comparable offer and the official conference proceedings do not
record any British response to the South African proposal.
Hertzog in his concluding speech at the conference observed that
it had not 'Jporne the fruit which we and the other Dominions have
hoped for' ,Lt> In a speech made in London before the conference
ended, Havenga had warned 'that if he and his colleagues did not
succeed at the Conference many people in South Africa who had
advocated other policies would have a much better chance of
succeeding in the future1. After his return to South Africa
Hertzog took up this theme, suggesting that unless Britain
altered its fiscal policy in the near future, South Africa would
be obliged to revise its own overseas trade policy. ' The
8siightly baleful tone of these speeches pointed to the
alternative policy already advocated by the Board of Trade and
Industries: the abandonment of preference and the negotiation of
commercial treaties with foreign countries.
It is possible that the undeclared intention behind the Union's
offer to stabilise the preference arrangements with Britain was
to prevent the addition of any new preferences in the immediate
future and thus to leave the Union with a free hand in its
negotiations with foreign countries. The Board of Trade and
Industries certainly enjoyed Hertzog's general confidence at this
time. In his reply to a letter from the journalist P A Molteno,
criticising the protectionist policy advocated by the Board,
Hertzog wrote: 'These men my err at times, but there is not the
least doubt that they have so far acted with the greatest
circumspection and care and stand acknowledged by all impartial
men in South Africa as a very efficient body.'" On the other
hand the line of policy followed by Hertzog and Haveoga before,
during and after the imperial conference of 1930 does not suggest
a wish to abolish imperial preference. Instead they were
concerned to stop the Bri tish from abandon!ng the existing
preferences. They were even willing to contemplate further
British preferences provided these could be negotiated on a
reciprocal basis. While they followed the Board's recommendation
in proposing at the imperial conference that the existing
preferences should be stabilised for three years, they showed no
new interest in negotiating commercial treaties with foreign
countries. In a speech in Cape Town made after his return from
the conference, Hertzog again showed his concern to retain the
existing preferences. Claiming that the British had agreed to
leave their preferences in place for three years, he added that
South Africa had to look for other markets, 'but we were prepared
to take considerable risks if we could be sure that there would
be preferential development for South African goods in British
markets'."
In terms of the Canadian premier R B Bennett's original proposal,
the Ottawa conference was meant to be a reconvened session of the
adjourned economic committee of the 1930 imperial conference.
That conference recommended that the proposed economic conference
should be held within the next year, which meant some time before
the end of October 1931. In the event the Ottawa conference did
not assemble until July 1932. The delay meant that by the time
it finally convened, the participating countries had experienced
almost two more years of deepening economic depression. The
effect was to increase the inclination of their governments to
look to the conference as a means of providing some relief from
the continuing economic blizzard. The postponement also gave the
United Kingdom's new National government the opportunity to
obtain the passage through parliament of the Import Duties Act.
For both Britain and the dominions the prospects of obtaining
mutually advantageous agreements on the basis of imperial
preference seemed to have been enhanced.
During the imperial conference of 1930 Havenga had privately
expressed to Bennett his doubts as to whether agreement at a
future economic conference would be possible as long as the
British remained attached to free trade and therefore unwilling
to grant preferences to dominion exports of food and raw
materials. In May 1931 G R Stevens, the Canadian trade
commissioner in South Africa, informed his government that
through talks with 'various permanent officials' he had
'discovered that no preparations were being made for attendance
at the proposed Economic Conference at Ottawa'. His impression
was that the South African government would 'probably try to
avoid sending delegation unless for the specific purpose of
concluding trade agreement with Canada*. Stevens accordingly
obtained permission to negotiate a preliminary agreement in South
Africa and by October 1931 both sides had made tentative
proposals. ]
Towards the end of 1931 the British government suggested that
preliminary discussions between expert advisers should be held,
both in the Union and in London, on possi ble reciprocal
preferential arrangements betweeen the United Kingdom and the
Union. Initially Havenga was inclined to allow matters to
proceed in this way, but in the end the Union government decided
that the discussions in South Africa could proceed but that those
envisaged for London should wait." Early in February 1932 the
British government forwarded a schedule of commodities on which,
it was held, new or increased preferences would benefit the
United Kingdom's export trade to South Africa.j4 It was agreed
that discussions on this schedule should begin in March, between
the United Kingdom's high commissioner in South Africa, H J
Stanley, assisted by A. Elmslie, the trade commissioner,and the
Union's representatives, J D Heddon, the commissioner of customs
and excise, and G S H .Rossouw, the new chairman of the Board of
Trade and Industries.30
On the British side Stanley warned his government in February
that 'present indications of interest and attitude of Union
Government are not very propitious' and that he doubted whether
the cabinet had decided on its policy: '...even in the
discussions with his own subordinates, Minister of Finance
maintains most frigid reserve'. His impression was that the Union
government was preoccupied with the politics of the gold standard
issue and the budget: '[the] political aspect of the economic
issue is likely to remain the paramount consideration. For the
purpose of Ottawa this is mosl unfortunate. At the moment [as a
result of] the recent controversies racial feel ing is in the
ascendancy and Nationalists are more than ever suspicious of any
course which could be represented as compromising [the] political
and economic independence of the Union. IJD
On 17 March Stanley reported on the fi rst phase of the
preliminary discussions. He had found the attitude of Heddon and
Roussouw 'more promising than I had anticipated' and thought it
possi ble that the Union 'might in certain eventualities be
prepared to contemplate substantial concessions even at some cost
to local secondary industries, but they emphasised that Ministers
would be averse [to] committing themselves.before they got to
Ottawa and saw how things developed there'.3' The South African
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officials were unable to take matters any further unti1 thei r
ministers returned from the parliamentary session in Cape
Town.38 Towards the end of March Stanley reported on
conversations he had with Havenga, who was not forthcoming, and
Hertzog, who 'seemed not to have applied his mind to the matter
[of reciprocal tariff concessions] and to know very little about
it'.39 By 11 May Stanley's impression was that 'Havenga wishes
to keep himself free in order to fish in troubled waters at
Ottawa, and to secure whatever benefit may be obtainable by a
process analagous to the honest brother [? broker] of
Bismarck'. °
Stanley's telegrams to the Dominions Office in May and June
i ndi cate that no further progress was made i n the prelimi nary
discussions with the Union officials who continued to be kept in
the dark as to Havenga's ' views and intentions . ' But in an
after-dinner conversation with Stanley on 20 May, Havenga
expressed himself as 'very willing to do what he could and to
play up'. Pleading pressure of parliamentary work, Havenga
undertook to go carefully into the matter of negotiations with
the United Kingdom on the voyage over. Stanley advised his
government 'to go easy with him and to abstain at this stage from
applying pressure. He is harassed and over-worked.'^ A week
later Stanley reported that Havenga 'has gone to his farm for
complete rest leaving Minister of Mines in charge of this
business'. In Stanley's view this minister, Fourie, who was a
member of the South African delegation for Ottawa, was unlikely
to take any definite decision on his own authority. Further talks
seemed unlikely, but Heddon had undertaken to provide Stanley
with provisional lists of British exports on which South^Africa
might be willing to offer new or increased preferences/11 These
lists were not produced and on 10 June Stanley reported that
nothing else was likely to be obtained from the South African
ministers before they embarked for England a week later.44
Apart from pursuing these fruitless preliminary discussions, the
British government also awaited the responses of all four
dominion governments to its telegram of 9 May indicating that the
free entry of dominion goods into Britain, in terms of the Import
Duties Act, would only be continued if the dominions made new
concessions on British imports to them. According to Drummond,
'this telegram so annoyed the Dominion governments that they
nearly broke off negotiations' . The attitude that the
dominions evidently shared was that this British demand was
unreasonable, particularly in view of the tariff concessions that
they had already given to Britain. In its answer to the telegram
the Union government indicated that it found it difficult to
formulate specific responses to the British requests, preferring
to group these i nto the three broad categories of 'yes',
'perhaps' and 'no'. '
The intention behind British policy was that the focus of the
preliminary discussions in the dominions should be on possible
new concessions favouring British exports in dominion markets.
The discussions in London were meant to relate to possible new
preferences for dominion exports to the United Kingdom.4'
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Although the Union government initially decided to entrust these
London discussions to Charles te Water, its high commissioner in
London, assisted by von Eden, it decided in the end not to pursue
these talks. The only entry which te Water made into the
negotiations was in Geneva early in February 1932, when he along
with the other dominion high commissioners was consulted by the
dominions secretary, J H Thomas. Thomas's proposal (which was the
policy afterwards followed) was that the Import Duties Act should
exempt the dominions from the new general tariff that would be
imposed, leaving them to make concessions to the United Kingdom
in the Ottawa negotiations. The alternative course would be to
exclude preferences for the dominions from the Act, leaving the
whole issue of reciprocal concessions for the Ottawa conference
to settle. Drummond writes: 'The Australians and New Zealanders
said "yes"; the South Africans and Irish said "no"; the Canadians
said "perhaps". >43
While he conceded that exemption for the dominions would benefit
South Africa by extending the market for i ts exports in the
United Kingdom, te Water went on to 'deprecate most strongly
South Africa's being put in a position where she would appear in
a bad light because of difficulties which were political rather
than economic, preventing her from reciprocating suitably at
Ottawa'. Admitting that he could not speak for his government,
te Water referred again to 'certain possibilities of political
danger for South Africa' (without explaining what these were) in
Thomas's proposal: 'He [te Water] did not approve of prior
concessions as the basis for statesmanship, and he would prefer
concessions to be negotiated and made at the Ottawa conference
itself. o 0
Even when Havenga and the rest of the South African delegation
met the British cabinet committee on the imperial economic
conference in London on 6 July 1932, en route to Ottawa, he
remained unforthcoming on the issue of concessions to Britain.
Claiming that since 1925 South Africa had allowed entry duty free
to British textiles as well as iron and steel, he explained that
it was 'more difficult for us today than for the other Dominions'
to make new concessions. As to concessions South Africa might
hope that Britain would make, for the first time Havenga unveiled
some detail. In the case of wool and to a lesser extent maize,
hides and skins, where the British Empire produced more than it
consumed, little could be expected. For the rest, the preferences
which Bri tain was offering applied only to goods which South
Africa already sold in the British market. But if the United
Kingdom would grant preferential entry to chilled meat and
'perhaps cattle on the hoof1, this 'would result in our selling
something to you which we are not selling to you to-day'. Such
a concession from Britain would not be without 'some return' from
South, Afri ca, but Havenga gave no hint as to the form this might
take.'1
Although this meeting ended in agreement that, before the
delegates left for Ottawa, further discussions should be held,
these evidently did not take place. Both the British and the
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South African delegates sailed to Canada on the Empress of
Britain. In the informal taiks held on board Baldwin, Lord
President of the Council and leader of the British delegation,
found the South Africans 'sticky' . B K Long, editor of the
Cape Times, who travelled to Ottawa to cover the conference as
a special correpondent, nevertheless reported that, after the
talks in London and on the voyage, the prospects of agreement
being reached between the British and the South Africans were
'substantial'. But Havenga declined to make any public statement
unti 1 talks had been held with ' the Australasians' who had
similar interests to the South Africans, of which meat was
one.53
Meanwhile details concerning the Union's preparations for Ottawa
had been announced in the house of assembly, by Hertzog in answer
to parliamentary questions and by Havenga in a statement during
the budget debate. 4 The Union delegation of three ministers was
to be led by Havenga, the others being P G W Grobler, the
Minister of Lands, and A J P Fourie, the Minister of Mines and
Industries. Dr G S H Roussouw, Bruwer's successor as chairman of
the Board of Trade and Industries, was named as one of the six
advisers, the others being senior public servants. Hertzog
indicated the government's readiness to receive suggestions from
interested parties and organisations, and Havenga named a number
of bodies that had been asked for their views on preferences and
tari ff policy.
As to the line to be followed in Ottawa, Havenga stated that the
Union's proposals would be decided upon in terms of domestic
policy. The point of departure would be the 1930 imperial
conference at which the Union had shown its will ingness to
contemplate preferential agreements within the Commonwealth on
a reciprocal basis provided that South Africa's industries could
be protected. For the rest the government would 'largely be
guided by what transpires at Ottawa'. Nothing further emerged
in public until Havenga's speech in London on 8 July, just before
the delegation's departure for Ottawa. Afcer defending the
Union's pol-icy of staying on the gold standard, Havenga conceded
that he expected 'monetary pol-icy' to figure prominently in the
discussions and indicated that South Africa loor-ed to trade
agreements to be reached in Ottawa as a way .of partially
re 1 i ev i ng ' the econom i c depress i on of the wor 1 ri' . •
In Canada, as the host country, and \r, Britain, elaborate
pr spa" at i ot'ts were made f ::>r th<;> Oi,tawa conference i n the ei ght
months or -so bef oi %» '• I convened . A1 though Bennett dec "> i nrid to
releasH an -i^enda unt'l 1 a vf?ry 1 ate stage-, Canadi an ci vi 1
-s-.-r v*n ts -i(1oVe;:--ed a wide range of subjects in a large series of
(nemo i1 ftnfja. ^orre of whi ch were made available to the other
"Gfrinv»."ivu.--5al i;.r> governments.3u In Britain the cabinet committee on
the Ottawa conference met eleven times between 23 November 1931
and 6 July 1932, and its reports and proceedings together with
the memoranda that were prepared for it constitute a large body
of material.3' In the South African case there is no equivalent
to documentation of this sort. Havenga in his house of assembly
statement referred to a memorandum that was being prepared by the
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Department of Agriculture, but no copy of this has been found.58
The local discussions between South African officials and their
British and Canadian counterparts point similarly to a lack of
systematic preparations for Ottawa in the Union's government
departments.
The six organisations named by Havenga in parliament as having
been approached by the government for their views were duly
represented at Ottawa: the Associated Chambers of Commerce (R
Stuttaford, MP for Claremont in the Cape, and W A Martin); the
Federated Chambers of Industry (H J Laite); the South African
Agricultural Union (A V Allan and G Heaton Nicholls, MP for
Zuiuland); the Cape Co-operative Wine Growers Association (the
KWV) (Senator J P Malan); the South African Sugar Association (W
E R Edwards); and the Chamber of Mines (P M Anderson, who was
desribed as representing the 'Gold Mining .Industry'in the list
sent to Canadalan  by the British government).59
The presence of Heaton Nicholls was the result of representations
to the government on behalf of the Federated Farmers Co-operative
Association which claimed to represent 'the leading co-operative
undertakings throughout the country1. On the suggestion of the
Minister of Agriculture, General J G Kemp, the SAAU was asked to
consult other interested parties and then nominate a
representative who would have the confidence of all. The SAAU
nominee was its chai rman, AT Ian, but Heaton NicholIs was
eventually recognised as the'second advisor under auspices [of
the] SAAU and subsidiary to Union's advisor'. 6l When the SAAU
indicated that it would have no objection to the appointment of
a further nominee representing the South African Co-operative
Deciduous Fruit Exchange, the government called a halt, deciding
not to 'accord official recognition as advisers' to any further
delegates. Heddon's minute, explaining Havenga's attitude,
indicated that the Sugar Association and the KWV had been given
'special recognition ... on account of their vital interests in
the export trade'.^ In the event Lieut.-Col. C C Cunningham
went to Ottawa as the representative of the Deciduous Fruit
Exchange, as did J Marais, a member of the Cape provincial
council who went as the representative of the Western Province
Tobacco Company and the South African Dried Fruit Company^, and
E Saunders, a further spokesman for Natal sugar interests.00 But
none of these additional representatives appeared in the Union
government's list of 'technical non-official advisers nominated
by the organizations indicated' who would be in Ottawa at their
own expense and not as guests of the Canadian government.
The 'non-official advisers' were given a purely consultative role
which would only be played in Ottawa when the ministers called
for it. Although some of these delegates had interviews with
ministers and their officials in Pretoria, no meeting of them was
called before the i r departure for Ottawa. Although he was
clearly part of the powerful sugar lobby, which included Allan,
Edwards and Saunders as we!1, Heaton NicholIs made it 'my
business to be primed in the needs of the primary producers
throughout the country'.64 While the advisers were in London, on
their way to Ottawa, they attended a meeting of the British
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Empire Producers' Organisation. This marked the first stage of
an attempt to co-ordinate proposals for preferences in the
British market for specific primary products on an Empire-wide
basis. " Aboard the Empress of Britain the South African
advisers were called together for a meeting with Havenga and
they also held discussions with their official counterparts, but
it seems that no clear South African strategy for Ottawa was
revealed at this stage.6fi
II
The Ottawa conference lasted a month, starting with a preliminary
meeting on 20 July and ending with a final plenary session on 20
August. Apart from the plenary sessions its formal proceedings
were made up of meetings of heads of delegations and meetings of
a dozen committees set up by the heads. Little emerged from these
proceedings beyond the innocuous general resolutions that
disappointed the more Empire-minded members of the British
delegation, notably Neville Chamberlain. The serious business of
the conference was conducted through negotiations between the
delegations leading to the series of bilateral agreements that
constituted the conference's main achievement. There were also
informal gatherings which permitted participation on the part of
the unofficial advisers. Both Canada and Australia nearly walked
out of the conference at particular points - Canada ower wheat
and Australia over meat. The British delegation also considered
withdrawal at one stage, on the ground that the dominions were
not offering enough in the way of reciprocity for British goods
in dominion markets.
South Africa's stake in the conference was not high enough to
justify a dramatic gesture of this sort, but its delegation
played a f ul 1 part in the crude bargaining that for the f i rst
time characterised the treatment of the preference issue at an
imperial conference. As the leader of a delegation Havenga was
overshadowed at fi rst by Baldwin and Bennett, but as the
conference proceeded his stature rose. B K Long, editor of the
Cape Times and the paper's special correspondent at the Ottawa
conference, claimed that Havenga was effective in his role as a
committee chairman and that he came to be recognised as one of
the few successes of the conference.5'
In the tariff-bargaining at Ottawa the general rule was that,
where preferences in the British market were concerned, all the
dominions would share in the benefits. But in the case of
preferences given to British goods in dominion markets the
arrangements would be bilateral only - that is, between Britain
and each dominion in turn. Since Havenga claimed that the
commodities named in the Import Duties Act were not especially
helpful for South Africa, his initial aim was not only to
preserve but to extend the preferences that South Africa had
enjoyed prior to the passage of the Act. Of these preferences
that for sugar was the most important, accounting for 69 per cent
of the total val ue .(i n terms of customs revenue) of South
Africa's preferences.00 Apart from wanting an increase in the
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preference on sugar, South Africa shared the hope with Australia
that their sugar might in future enter the British market on
equal terms with colonial sugar from the West Indies which had
hitherto enjoyed a higher preference. Before Ottawa the British
government had been inclined to exclude sugar from the list of
commodities on which increased preferences benefiting South
Africa might be granted, in view of the anticipated need to
protect the home producer of beet sugar." At Ottawa the
dominions obtained a small increase in the existing sugar
preference but failed to secure the removal of the addi tional
preference enjoyed by colonial sugar. They also failed in their
bid to obtain the stabi1isat ion of the sugar preference for a
period of ten years in the face of Britain's refusal to consider
this unti1 the royal commission of inqui ry into the home sugar
industry had made its report.0
The other principal products on which South Africa enjoyed
preference before the Import Duties Act was passed were wine,
dried fruit and tobacco. The preferences on the first two were
increased siightly at Ottawa and the existing preference on
tobacco was stabi1ised for a period of ten years. While the
failure to obtain an increased preference on tobacco was a
disappointment, the Union's delegation did not associate itself
with the vain bid of other dominion producers to secure a quota
for tobacco in the United Kingdom market.'1 Products listed in
the Import Duties Act for which South Africa would continue to
enjoy free entry in terms of the Ottawa agreements included eggs
and poultry, dai ry products, white mai ze and fruit. Of these
fruit was the item on which the South African delegation
concentrated at Ottawa.
With the conference in prospect the Deciduous Fruit Exchange had
approached the Union government in April pressing the industry's
need for preference in the United Kingdom market and submitting
a memorandum on deciduous fruits, prepared for the information
of the South African delegation to Ottawa. This stressed the
industry's dependence on exports (85 per cent of which went to
the United Kingdom) and the problems arising from the perishable
nature of the product. The industry claimed to give employment
to 20 000 white and 100 000 coloured workers. The objective at
Ottawa should be to eliminate or at least restrict foreign
competition, especially of the dumping variety of which one
instance was the export to Britain of the United States surplus
from i ts home market. Reference was also made to the damaging
effect of the Union government's insistence on retaining the gold
standard on the Union's fruit exports in the face of Australian
and Argentinian competition. South Africa should ask for a 25 per
cent ad valorem duty on foreign fruit in the British market. 'l
The Deciduous Fruit Exchange, which claimed to represent the
fruit growers, eventually sent Lieut.Col. C C Cunningham to
Ottawa as its representative although he was not recognised by
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well as the Irish Free State and Southern Rhodesia, were
represented. The goal pursued by the dominions was to increase
the British Empire's share of the United Kingdom market beyond
the prevailing 30 per cent, to obtain a preference higher than
the standard 10 per cent offered in terms of the Import Duties
Act and to have seasonal restrictions placed on imports of
foreign fruit to Britain. While conceding that vi rtually only
South Africa was interested in the inclusion of citrus, Havenga
requested this, citing competition from Brazil and dumping by the
United States as obstacles for South African producers.'3
Havenga's summary of the requests of the dominions on fruit was
handed to the British ministers on 28 July.'4 While the British
did not immediately agree to any seasonal restrictions on foreign
fruit entering the United Kingdom, the terms of the Union's
agreement with Britain indicate that most of the other dominion
objectives were met: new preferences were granted on deciduous
fruit (for example, 5s. per cwt. on apples) and citrus (also 5s.
per cwt. ). Also the preference on dried fruit was raised from the
previous 7/- per cwt. to 10/- per cwt. Reaction in South Africa
to the publ i cat ion in October 1932 of the terms of the Ottawa
agreements suggests that the fruit industry (particular citrus)
was seen as one of the major beneficiaries of Ottawa.
At the time of the Ottawa negotiations the South African
government was engaged in an effort, as Drummond puts it, to
'invent' an export trade in chilled beef. Given the non-
existence of such a trade hitherto and the lack of any strong
representations from organised agriculture (in contrast to the
case of the fruit producers), this seems to have been an exercise
undertaken on the government's own initiative. Ear 1y in 1932 a
memorandum on the cattle industry was placed before the Union
cabinet that included a discussion of the possibi1ity of the
Union's supplying chilled beef to the British market. The need
for a high Quality product was noted but there was no mention of
preference.' By May 1932 the first experimental exports of
chilled beef had reached London.
At the South African delegation's meeting wi th the British
cabinet committee on Ottawa, held in London en route to the
conference early in July 1932, Havenga stressed South Africa's
hopes for an agreement on meat covering chilled beef and possibly
cattle on the hoof. He failed to mention the political
dividend for his government that would result from an agreement
calculated to benefit cattle producers throughout the country,
especially the Afrikaner farmers of the highveld Interior, in
contrast to the localised advantage that preferences could bring
to sugar, fruit and wine fanners.0"' In his supplementary opening
statement at the Ottawa conference itself, in considering
commodities for which new preferences might be sought, Havenga
again emphasised South Africa's hopes regarding chilled beef
expor t,.s .:
Dur i ng the Ottawa negotiations South Africa held informal
discussions with the Australian delegation (which was mainly
interested in frozen rather than chilled meat), participated in
the deliberations of the conference committees which sought to
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co-ordinate the requests from the dominions on meat and pursued
its specific aims in negotiating the bilateral agreement with the
United Kingdom. The dominions claimed that 76 per cent of meat
imports into the United kingdom were 'foreign': 'The present
dominance of the foreigner, with his unlimi ted supplies, if
allowed to continue, means the destruction of the agricultural
and pastoral interests of the Empi re.'82 Though extravagant,
this assertion was understandable in the context of the Great
Depression. The remedy was to increase the Empire's share in this
trade by means not only of preferential duties (which, in the
view of the dominions, would not be effective on their own) but
also a quota that would severely limit supplies from foreign
countries. By 14 August it was known that the British were
against meat preferences and would be willing to negotiate on a
quota basis (involving quantitative restrictions) only. Since
they believed that the United Kingdom had already agreed in
principle to negotiate both preferences and a quota, the
Australians almost walked out of the conference at this point.
They only stayed once Britain had agreed to further reductions
in the quotas to be allowed to foreign suppliers.
South Africa's interest in the meat issue was serious, but it was
not (in contrast to that of Australia) perceived to be vital.
Whereas the other dominions were hoping for 'heavy' limits on
foreign quotas for pig products (Canada's interest), frozen
mutton and lamb and frozen beef, South Africa could only expect
'moderate' limits on South American chilled beef. Also the
British were committed to an arrangement that might favour
Argentina (holder of the 1 ion's share of this market) over
Uruguay and Brazi 1 . As in the case on the other dominions,
South Africa's deal with the United Kingdom over meat was not an
integral part of the Ottawa trade agreements but the subject of
an exchange of correspondence conducted as the conference was
closing. The actual quotas would only be decided by Britain in
consultation with the dominions during 1933. In South Africa's
case, should any 'practical difficulty' arise, the British
undertook to use thei r good offices with shippers from South
American sources. Explaining the contents of the Ottawa
agreements to the Union house of assembly in January 1933,
Havenga showed some understanding for the British stand aginst
meat preferences. Given the smallness of existing meat exports
from the dominions to Britain, it was unreasonable to expect the
British to impose 'a tax on meat1 simply to increase the dominion
share. In the case of chilled beef dominion exports to 3ritain
were 'infinitesimal'. Even' under the new arrangements, 'the
prospects of supplying a very large share of the chi1 led beef
requirements of the United Kingdom are not unduly rosy'. After
Ottawa South Africa could also negotiate access to the British
market for frozen mutton and lamb, but hitherto this was a non-
existent and entirely unpromoted export trade.
Havenga's statement to parliament included an explanation of the
Union's approach to the problem of granting • reciprocal
preferences to British goods. Four 'cardinal principles' were
observed: fi rst, 'the protection enjoyed by established and
economically sound industries in the Union should not be
18
destroyed'; secondly, ' any change of duties should not materially
increase the cost of living'; thirdly, 'British manufacturers
should be in a position to supply the goods in the quantities and
descriptions required'; finally, 'any diversion of trade to the
United Kingdom should, as far as possible, not be at the expense
of those countries with which the Union has a favourable balance
of trade'. The detailed schedules that emerged from Ottawa had
not been prepared 'haphazardly' but from lists submitted by the
British government. These lists had been scrutinised before the
departure of the Union's delegation to Ottawa and had also been
examined by associations of commerce and the Federated Chamber
of Industries as well as by the non-official delegates present
at Ottawa. As for the British delegation, Havenga claimed that
they had not contested the principles behind Union policy and
* indeed, were in entire agreement with our ideas'.
The path to agreement on the reciprocity issue had been less
smooth than Havenga's account suggested. Nothing specific in the
way of reaction to the British lists emerged from Havenga himself
before the Union delegation arrived in Ottawa. From talks which
he and the British trade commissioner, Elmslie, had held with
South African officials, the British high commissioner in South
Africa, Stanley, drew the optimistic forecast that 'the Union
government might in certain eventualities be prepared to
contemplate substantial concessions even at some cost to local
secondary industries' . In drawing up thei r proposals the
British government had placed some reliance on Elmslie's views
on the Union's preference policy. He advised that the most likely
area for preference was that of high quality and luxury goods.
Also small rebates would probably not prove especially valuable
and the British should look for 'substantial duty rebates on a
carefully selected limited list of goods'. Finally he pointed to
certain anomalies affecting the operation of the existing
preferences on British goods. The United Kingdom share in some
items, such as jewellery and watches, had increased after the
ending of a 3 per cent ad valorem preference in 1925. On the
other hand new rebates had not led to an increase in the United
Kingdom's share of the Union market in items such as machinery
and metal manufactures. While an increased preference on low-
priced cotton piece goods had not increased the British share of
the market, the British share in respect of higher priced goods
was maintained despite the loss of the preference. Shortly
before the Union delegation left South Africa in June 1932,
Elsmlie reported that the Federated Chamber of Industry would
strongly oppose any preference on goods manufactured in South
Afri ca, but that representati ves of the footwear and 1 eather
industry and the printing industry had passed resolutions
agreeing to the principle of preference on materials used by
their industry. Others might follow suit. The British also knew,
before meeting Havenga in London, that an industrial conference
meeting in Durban had informed the British high commission of its
willingness to consider the imposition of preferential duties on
al 1 items in Class XV of the British 1 ists as wel 1 as on
industrial machinery.
When the South African delegation met in London with the British
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cabinet committee on Ottawa early in July 1932, Baldwin outlined
certain preferences that South Africa might consider granting to
British goods. Derived from the British 1ists, these were
proposed under three headings: fi rst, a category taking into
account South Africa's need for customs revenue, the impact of
preferences on the cost of 1iving and the United Kingdom's
ability to supply the goods in question; secondly, items to be
considered in relation to similar products of the Union's
industries and the effect on these of preferences; thirdly, items
on which preference might be impracticable in view of the
interests of the Union's industries. Baldwin added that whi le
South Africa's need to protect its industries was understood by
the British, the Union should buy from the United Kingdom rather
than from 'the foreigner1 when imports were essential. Influenced
perhaps by the imperialist 'visionaries' in the Conservative
Party, he also referred to the possibi1ity of 'Imperial
Industrial Co-operation', an endeavour in which * businesses'
should take the initiative. Havenga's response was to assert
that, in contrast to Canada, South Africa under the arrangements
of 1925 al ready al lowed in, duty free, texti les and i ron and
steel products from the United Kingdom. It was therefore
difficult for South Africa to make new concessions. He
nevertheless offered the assurance that South Africa understood
the need for reciprocity: there would have to be l some return1
from South Africa for any benefits received.
Throughout the Ottawa conference Havenga continued to confine
himself to generalities where concessions to Britain were
concerned. On the progress of the bilateral discussions with the
British he informed Hertzog on 26 July that the prospects for an
agreement were good. While Chamberlain at this stage was
finding Havenga 'most helpful', the problem that Havenga.gave the
British was that he decl ined to offer concessions." He was
wi 11 ing to stabi1ise the existing preferences, but if the
British wanted new ones they must submit proposals. The Canadians
made an offer to the British on 4 August that Baldwin found 'of
little value': Havenga's offer made a day later was 'too like it
to be of use1. * On 7 August the British decided to ask for a 15
per cent preference on a wide range of goods, but Havenga
declined to contemplate even 10 per cent. Eventually the British
settled more or less on the basis of the concessions contained
in Havenga's offer."
Under the agreement with the United Kingdom the preferences
granted by South Africa in 1925 were stabilised with increases
in some specific items, for example mining and industrial
machinery, where the preferential margin was increased from 3 to
5 per cent. New preferences were also introduced, mainly on
certain items of machinery but also on some textiles and clothing
items. On the figures for imports to the Union in 1931 the total
trade in the items now covered by preferences was #13 000 000,
•incl uding #7, 000 000 for the items covered by the previous
preferences.33 A significant omission from this agreement, in
contrast to the United Kingdom's agreements with Canada and
Austral ia, was the lack of any provision for tariff boards
entrusted with the task of enabling British manufacturers to
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enter dominion markets as 'domestic competitors'. When the
British put forward such a proposal in the case of South Africa
Havenga rejected the idea out of hand.3'
The Economist, taking into account tariff levels as well as the
fact that almost half South Africa's imports entered duty
judged the country to be only 'moderately protectionist'.
Havenga made a similar claim, arguing that that this moderation
enabled South Africa to get by with relatively slight concessions
at Ottawa and thus keep its protectionist policy in place. When
the terms agreed to at Ottawa became known in South Africa there
was no outcry from any protectionist lobby. A plausible reason
for this emerges in a statement made by F S A Graves, the
secretary of the Federated Chambers of Commerce, in a
conversation with the Canadian trade commissioner, G R Stevens,
some months before Ottawa: 'both commerce and industry in South
Africa are much warmer protagonists of Imperial co-operation than
the present Government'. While the British government and The
Economist did not think South Africa had been generous at Ottawa,
commercial interests in South Africa praised the concessions made
to British exports. The 'large' preference given to i ron and
steel goods was found to be 'most surprising' (perhaps in view
of possible competition with Iscor) and the preferences for
British textiles and cotton, rayon and silk piece goods were
similarly welcomed.'00
Concern that South Africa should retain its foreign trade was a
factor that limited Havenga's readiness to agree to increased
preferences for British exports throughout the Ottawa
negotiations. To parliament he afterwards explained that one of
the 'cardinal principles' adhered to had been that any diversion
of trade should, if possible, not take place at the expense of
countries with which the Union enjoyed a favourable balance of
trade. Reporting to Hertzog on the agreement reached with the
United Kingdom, Havenga claimed that Britain, through the
increased preferences, would be able to capture part of South
Africa's trade with Japan and the United States (countries with
which South Africa's trade balance was unfavourable), but that
trade with France, Italy, the Netherlands and Germany (with all
of which the Union's balance of trade was favourable) would only
be slightly affected.101
Havenga's claim was too sanguine as Italy's reaction shows. After
the Ottawa conference, Fourie, the Minister of Mines and
Industries, proceeded to Europe entrusted with the task of
dealing with some of the repercussions of the agreements on the
Union's foreign trading partners. To the Italian government he
gave the assurance that the Ottawa agreements would not adversely
affect Italy's trade with the Union. But in South Africa the
Italian mi nister, Count N Labi a, protested strongly in a
conversation with Fourie that the fbig preference on British
cotton goods [would] knock Italian trade'. Fourie then hinted
that Britain could be asked to forego these preferences: 'It was
pointed out to him by Heddon that this preference was about the
most important concession which Great Britain had got from the
Union and it had in fact been decisive; if there was any talk of
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revision now it would certainly be necessary to suggest some very
big concession in its place.1'02 Before the conference, in June
1932, as he explained in a letter to Hertzog in October, Labia
had submitted a memorandum which pressed for the retention of
Italy's market in the Union for soft goods which made up some
four-fifths of Italy's exports to South Africa. He had also
discussed the matter with the Union's delegation before thei r
departure for Ottawa. But Fourie's and other 'assurances' from
the Union government 'had been proved untrue'. An Italian trade
of #780 000 had been adversely affected to an amount of #135 000
and Labia had reason to believe that the damage would prove to
be greater. 'What pains me so deeply,' he wrote, 'is that the
happy and beneficial relations which for years I have so
untiringly been working to establish between our two countries,
both so dear to me, should be so suddenly endangered.'"0 Labia
arranged to meet Hertzog, Havenga and Fourie early in November,
but no concession to Italy was forthcoming. This was not
surprising, especially in view of Havenga's attitude. He was said
to have gone 'straight off the deep-end' after learning of
Fourie's hint that any change could be made to the Ottawa
agreement with Britain, adding that Fourie had had no right to
offer his original assurance in Rome. |U4
In the case of Germany the issue was not the the direct effects
of the Ottawa agreements on German exports to South Africa but
the implicat ions for South Africa's commercial treaty with
Germany. This treaty, cone! tided in 1928, did not permit the
extension of new preferences to British goods unless Germany
received the same concessions. In July 1930, three months before
the imperial conference of that year met, Ruter,an official at
the German embassy in London, in a conversation with the Union's
high commissioner, Charles te Water, expressed his government's
anxiety about moves towards 'free trade within the [British]
Empire'. Ruter's view was that denunciation of the German treaty
by South Africa would be 'a calamity' but he added that if only
the clause dealing with preferences (article (8) of the treaty)
were denounced 'the consequences would not be far-reaching'. ^ 5
Towards the end of 1931 the possibility of seeking a revision of
the German treaty was placed before the Union cabinet. The issue
was raised by members of the Board of Trade and Industry in the
context of the preliminary discussions with Canada over a
possible bilateral trade agreement with the Union and Germany's
conclusion of an agreement involving maize exports from Rumania.
The line taken was that while Germany should not be provoked into
denouncing the treaty, for its part the Union should not simply
agree to the German - Rumani an treaty. Instead a rev i s i on of
article (8) should be sought that would leave the,ynion free to
conclude agreements based on imperial preference.11'5
Judging from Hertzog's reply of 'No' to a parliamentary question
i n February 1932, when he was asked whether •; t was the
government's intention to denounce the German treaty, the cabinet
Look no action.10' This decision was taken in spite of a British
attempt, as reported to the United Kingdom's cabinet committee
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Union government to denounce the German treaty at least to the
extent of doing away with the most-favoured-nation treatment
promised to Germany in respect of any new preferences given to
British goods.108
At the Ottawa conference Havenga asserted from the outset that
the hands of the Union delegation were not fettered as a result
of any treaties with foreign countries.109 Later he was elected
as chairman of the conference Committee on Commercial Relations
with Foreign Countries. At its first meeting on 10 August 1932
the implications of the most-favoured-nation clause in dominion
treaties with foreign countries were discussed and the question
was raised as to whether a Commonwealth resolution should be
passed:
'Mr Havenga pointed out that it was open to question whether any
resolution of the Conference could affect the rights which
foreign countries might claim to possess under commercial
treaties with parts of the Empire. The passing of a resolution
on this question would probably raise constitutional issues. So
far as South Africa was concerned, the Government was taking
adequate steps to free thei r hands in regard to preferences
granted at the Conference. Further, if any foreign country
challenged the accord of such preferences as being a
contravention of most-favoured-nation rights, his Government
would not hesitate to denounce the treaty in question.'
The committee agreed that no formal resolution on the most-
favoured-nation issue would be submitted to the conference and
that each government would take the necessary steps to safeguard
the preferences. l0
In South Africa's case the necessary steps were entrusted to
Fourie, the Minister of Mines and Industries, who would proceed
from Ottawa to Europe to 'investigate conditions Germany Italy
et cetera' .il! This was made known publ icly as the conference
ended and Fourie accomplished his mission in Berlin early in
September. The necessary amendment to article (&) was effected
by an exchange of notes transacted in October.!lc In a private
reply to a critic in his own party, N J van der Merwe, who had
objected to the amendment of the German treaty, Havenga later
stated that it had always been the government's intention to
amend the treaty if an expansion of trade on the basis of
imperial preference was negotiated.1
Ill
The Pact government began its rule hostile to imperial
preference. Guided by the recommendations of the Board of Trade
and Industries, it moved against the preferences enjoyed by
Britain in the South African market by putting the Tariff Act
through par 1iament in 1925. The government then explored the
prospects for extending its trade with foreign countries. The
chief product of this initiative was the commercial treaty
concluded with Germany in 1928. At this stage the Board of Trade
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and Industries, though perhaps not the cabinet, had on its agenda
further measures for dismantling South Africa's preference
arrangements with Britain.
In the course of 1929 the cabinet, though certainly not the Board
of Trade and Industries, evidently had second thoughts. When the
Labour government in Britain, seeking to honour its commitment
to its working class supporters to keep food cheap, threatened
unilaterally to end preferences in the British home market, the
Union protested as strenuously as any other dominion.'1* In 1929
and 1930 the Union government made various efforts to get the
prevailing preferences stabilised on a bilateral basis for three
years. Hertzog conceded in parliament, that the abolition of the
existing preferences would be 'very disastrous' for South Africa
and the imperial conference of 1930 gave him a further chance to
try to retain them. i5
This goal therefore was already being pursued by the Union in
August 1931, when the National government took office in Britain.
As the preparations for Ottawa began, and particularly after the
Import Duties Act made the revision and extension of imperial
preferences a definite prospect, there was no doubt about the
Union's willingness to participate. The first objective was to
make sure that the existing preferences, confirmed and slightly
extended in some cases by the Import Duties Act, were not lost.
The second was to seek further preferences for Union products in
the British market. The willingness of the Union to conclude new
agreements, not only with the United Kingdom but also with
Canada, on the basis of imperial preference, and to make at least
a few concesssions benefiting British exports to South Africa,
marked a significant change. When the decision virtually to set
aside the teaty with Germany is taken into account as wel1, a
fai rly sharp reversal of policy can be discerned. Havenga's
claims for continuity of policy since 1925, made particularly
when answering critics in his own party, are unconvincing.
If there was in fact a reversal of policy, the explanation for
this lies largely in the impact of the Great Depression on South
Africa. The fal 1 in world agricultural prices was evident in
1928, before the onset of the depression. As the depression
deepened, and more particularly as South African exports ran into
greater difficulties in the period from September 1931 onward,
the piight of those of South Africa's farmers who depended on
exporting thei r products worsened. Whereas South Africa had
declined to follow Britain's example in leaving the gold
standard, most of her competitors in the export market, such as
Australia, had softened the impact of falling prices by devaluing
their currencies. All this served to place a premium on imperial
preference in 1932 that had been absent in in 1925.
In response to one of the sharpest critics among his fel low
Nationalists, N J van der Merwe, MP for the Orange Free State
constituency of Winburg, Havenga claimed that the Ottawa
agreements were part of the logical execution of National Party
policy 'for years', namely the extension of trade through
reciprocal tariff advantages:
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[The Ottawa agreements] fulfi1 led this need and provided such
advantages to our sorely tried primary producers in relation to
the sale of their products in this time of restricted markets,
that no Party in South Africa would have dared to refuse to make
use of the opportunity that arose from the change in its fiscal
policy by Great Britain.1'6
This is acceptable as an explanation of South Africa's ful 1
participation in the Ottawa negotiations. But the implication
that an entirely consistent policy had been followed since 1925
is again suspect.
In South Africa's case the timing of Ottawa was significant in
relation to the policy the government followed toward the gold
standard. The conference opened some ten months after the British
government, in September 1931, accepted that the pound could no
longer be maintained on a par with gold. South Africa chose to
stay on gold rather than to take the course of the other
dominions in following Britain and so joining the emergent
sterling bloc. In the Dominions Office the Union's policy was
perceived as ' a strategy of financial independence' that put
South Africa out of step with the rest of the Empi re-
Commonwealth. ''' In a speech made in London in July 1932, en
route to Ottawa, Havenga conceded that in staying on gold the
Union was 'ploughing a lonely furrow'. 8
In this context South Africa's co-operative conduct at Ottawa was
seen as marking the Union's return to the Commonwealth fold. This
process was rounded off four months later, in December 1932, when
South Africa at last moved off the gold standard. In terms of
domestic politics South Africa's participation at Ottawa formed
part of the background to coalition in 1933. The praise Havenga
received from the South African Party for his contribution to the
exercise in imperial co-operation at Ottawa, though hardly
decisive, served to lower the temperature of party political
conf1ict.
This examination of imperial preference as an issue for South
Africa in the period 1925 to 1932 supports the finding that in
formulating policy the cabinet, and particularly Havenga as the
minister with overall responsibility, enjoyed a large measure of
autonomy. There were no attempts on the part of special interests
to drive the government into courses of action that it was
reluctant to take. The organisations with an interest in the
prospects of Ottawa did not extend much beyond the bodies named
by Havenga in his initial statement on the conference that was
made to parliament in April 1932. The main interest involved
could be defined as a fairly limited component of that sector of
South African agriculture, itself only small at the time, that
was oriented towards export markets. The wool farmers were the
dominant interest in the sector as a whole, but they had no
interest in imperial preference. The British Empire produced more
wool than it could consume, so i t was to world rather than
imperial markets that the wool farmers looked. It was sugar
25
farmers, wine farmers and growers of deciduous and citrus fruit
who were mainly interested in imperial preference and Ottawa. The
local and sectional nature of these interests helps to explain
the government's effort to 'invent' an export trade to Britain
in chilled beef. Beyond agriculture the main interests affected
by Ottawa were newly protected secondary industries which might
have been hurt had Havenga made any major concessions to imports
of British manufactures. Since he avoided doing so there was no
outcry against Ottawa from the protectionist lobby.
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